



---

Vol. XII.

Richmond, Va., June, 1884.

No. 6.

---

The Last Chapter in the History of Reconstruction in South Carolina—Administration of D. H. Chamberlain.

By F. A. PORCHER, *President South Carolina Historical Society.*

PAPER No. 3.

RICEFIELD RIOTS.

In May of this year occurred one of those riots which distinguished the close of Chamberlain's administration, and seemed to demonstrate how utterly unfit he was for his elevated position. A strike for higher wages took place among the negroes of the Cornlaher ricefields. Whether the negroes had just grounds of complaint against their employers, is a question of no moment whatever. A morbid sentiment endeavored to excuse them on the ground of unfair conduct on the part of the planters. It is a sufficient answer to this that the negroes, who by contract lived and worked habitually on the plantations, did not begin the strike. It began with those who, living elsewhere, were occasionally hired to assist the regular forces. These persons not only refused to work for such wages as were offered them, (which

they had a perfect right to do,) but they became lawless, when they compelled the contract hands to stop work also. It is a high-handed outrage, becoming so common all over the country as to be acquiring the force of unwritten law—a practice which strikes at the root of all civilization, by making the will of an unreasoning mob, the superior law of the land. As soon as men resort to violence to bend others to their wills, all considerations but that of order must give way to the higher one of saving the country from anarchy, and even if the cause is originally right, it becomes thoroughly vitiated when it is attempted to enforce it by violence.

The Governor failed to adopt those decisive measures, which alone could restore order. A trial justice was appointed to arrest the ring-leaders and bring them to punishment, and he issued, through the sheriff, a proclamation full of wisdom and good counsel, but, unfortunately, an offer of amnesty if the rioters would desist. The appointment of this trial justice seemed to give offence to the negroes, but it does not appear that he took any steps to quell the disturbance, and, indeed, when the Governor promised immunity to the guilty, what was the use of proceeding against any one? Whatever may have been the cause of the disturbance, it was soon converted into a conflict of races, and the hostility of the blacks was excited by all sorts of devices. Among these was the following parody of a popular hymn, which was sung when the rioters wished to stimulate themselves and encourage others to join them :

A charge to keep I have,  
A negro to maintain,  
A never dying thirst for power,  
To bind him with a chain.

To sever the present age,  
Our pockets we must fill;  
We'll make them work for wages now  
And never pay the bill.

Arm me with zealous care  
To make him know his place;  
And oh thy servants, Lord, prepare  
To rule the negro race.

Help us to rob and shoot  
The nigger on the sly,  
Assured if they don't vote for us,  
They shall forever die.

This precious parody bears on its face the mark of a white radical. The war of races was already begun in the rice-field districts. The disturbances continued for a fortnight, and ended seemingly because, after the negroes had manifested their power, and found that the Governor was either unable or unwilling to repress them, they were willing to leave the country quiet until a later season, when they could renew the disturbances and do more mischief.

About the same time an incident occurred in Edgefield which grew out of the mistrust entertained by the people against the trial by jury as practised in the State. It was an act of will-justice perpetrated by white men, with no consideration of party politics, and which was used with telling effect in the bitter contest approaching for the chief magistracy of the Union. An aged couple named Harmon, living on the border of Edgefield and Abbeville, were found one morning murdered, and there were manifest signs that robbery had been committed and arson attempted. Suspicion against certain negroes was soon converted into certainty by the confession of one of them, and six men and two women were brought before the coroner. A verdict of guilty of murder was brought in against all of them, and the coroner delivered the prisoners to the Sheriff to be taken for trial to Edgefield jail. Some two hundred white men were now present on the occasion. As soon as the sheriff had received his prisoners he was approached by some men disguised, a sheet thrown around him. He was conveyed to a neighboring house and locked in. Meanwhile the prisoners, all but the women, were led off into the woods and quietly shot. Neither the sheriff nor any one else seemed to know the persons who committed this act of violence; but it would be unfair not to add that the public mind was not displeased that summary justice had speedily overtaken the perpetrators of the outrage upon the unhappy old couple, and were not allowed the chance of escape, which a jury trial made so very probable. When law is lax or impotent, society is forced to recur to first principles. This is, unfortunately, too often done all over the United States; but that which in a Northern or Western State is regarded as an occasional and regrettable act of violence, is held, when done at the South, as the result of deep design and of premeditated mischief. The governor again issued a proclamation, full of moral and political wisdom, but directed against no one. He wrote to Carpenter, the circuit judge, to urge him to discover the perpetrators of the outrages, and to bring to trial the women who had been found guilty by the coroner's inquest, but spared by the lynchers.

## TWENTY-EIGHTH JUNE.

Meanwhile rumors were rife respecting the conduct and attitude of Chamberlain. It was asserted that the feud between him and Patterson was to be healed over and certain tamperings with the funds of the State effected for their joint benefit. To this rumor Chamberlain gave an indignant denial. He said that no terms of reconciliation had been offered, and that he would regard any settlement of dissensions in the Republican party in the State which compromised the cause of reform as worse than defeat. It was by such declarations as these that he continued to preserve the good will with which he was regarded by many of the Conservatives. They saw in him the one man in whom they could hope for any mitigation of radical misrule, and though he often showed deplorable weakness, they would not desert him. They clung to him as their anchor of hope. They saw no alternative but to take him with all his imperfectness, and a desperate struggle against fearful odds, in which defeat was certain destruction.

Then came the celebration in Charleston of June 28th.

This day, peculiarly the day of Charleston and of Carolina, has always been celebrated by some of the military companies of the city. On this occasion the Rifle Club, known as the Palmetto Club, had determined to expose to view a monument which they had erected in White Point Garden to commemorate the hundredth anniversary of the battle of Fort Moultrie. All the rifle clubs in the city took part in the celebration, together with several companies from Georgia, and detachments from companies in New York and Boston, which had come to assist in the pageant. The command for the day was conferred on Gen. Wade Hampton, the chief of the cavalry of the Confederate army. The Governor was invited to partake of the festivities and cheerfully accepted the invitation. It must be remembered that the rifle clubs were bodies without legal organization, which had sprung into existence at the conduct of Governor Scott, when he refused to reorganize any white militia, and lavishly bestowed arms and ammunition upon the negroes, whom he had organized throughout the State. They were bodies organized under the great law of self-preservation, when it seemed to be the object of the Governor to put the whites entirely at the mercy of the negroes. If Chamberlain reflected upon the unlawfulness of these organizations he kept his thoughts to himself, and seemed to enter into the spirit of the cel-



eburation with as much zeal as any one else. It was not long after that he discovered that they were unlawful and dangerous associations, and brought the whole weight of his own authority, as well as that of the Federal Government to disarm and suppress them. But to-day all was calm and bright, and nothing occurred to mar the pleasure of the occasion except the fierce rays of a midsummer's morning sun, which prostrated the troops engaged in the pageant and spoiled the show. In this pageant were representatives of the army. The era of good feeling seemed to have commenced, the North and the South, the Gray and the Blue, the Confederates and the Federals, all united in doing honor to the historic day of Charleston, and all marched under the orders of a Confederate General. The Governor was among the happiest of the guests. This day was one of the last of peace and good will. Events were speedily approaching which were going to establish the deepest hostilities between the Governor, who was growing rapidly popular, and the only people who had given him an intelligent support

#### HAMBURG RIOT.

On the evening of Saturday, July 8th, a conflict arose at Hamburg between sundry white citizens and a party of blacks, who pretended to be the militia of the State, which resulted in the killing of a young man by the the name of Merriweather. Exasperated at the death of their companion, and unable to make any impression upon the brick house into which the negroes had thrown themselves, the whites sent to Augusta for a piece of artillery, with which they battered the house and drove out the blacks. The latter escaped from the house, and twenty-five of them fell into the hands of the whites. There was some talk of sending them to the jail in Aiken, but after a while they were dismissed. As they ran off on being released, five of them were shot dead and three wounded. This story was circulated over the country the next day with all the horrors which a partisan press could invent. Gen. M. C. Butler, one of Carolina's favorite and most trusted sons, was represented as the leader in the attack on the house and the instigator of the inhuman massacre which followed their capture. It was a story too shocking for belief. But it so happened that Gen. Butler was there, and had been enough concerned in the events which preceded the tragedy to give a color to the story. Gen. Butler indignantly denied the whole accusation; said that he was in Hamburg on professional business, which he was prevented from accomplishing by the officers of the militia, and added

that "the collision was the culmination of the system of outrage and insulting the white people, which the negroes had there adopted for several years; many things were done on that terrible night that cannot be justified, but the negroes had sown the wind and had reaped the whirlwind."

Having related the general fact of the collision and massacre, I am at a loss to determine how to proceed. Though often urged, the government never made this tragedy the subject of a judicial enquiry. A coroner's inquest was held, at which an immense amount of the most extravagant testimony (*ex parte*) was offered, and subsequently, on proceeding on a *habeas corpus*, other testimony of a very different character was given by witnesses whose character and standing entitled them to respect. But in neither case did the testimony undergo that sifting and scrutiny which a judicial examination alone can elicit. *Prima facie* the testimony for the government must have been considered insufficient to make a case against the accused; for though repeatedly urged to prosecute, they refused to do so. Another very ugly feature in the case is, that though a coroner's inquest was promptly held to enquire into the death of the negroes, no notice was taken of the death of Merriweather, who was the first victim of the affray. Perhaps the best plan that can be pursued is to tell the story as it was told by each party, beginning with that of Chamberlain and his Attorney-General, Stover, which, having an official character, was received as true and greedily swallowed by everybody outside of the State. I must premise by saying that the two great parties in the country had selected their candidates for the Presidency, and the contest promised to be bitter and unscrupulous. It was known that the Southern States, except those under negro dominion, would support Mr. Tilden, whose great services in weeding out corruption in New York had commended him to good men all over the country. To counteract this favorable opinion, it was the aim of the supporters of Mr. Hayes to stigmatize the cause of Tilden by representing him as the supporter of Southern outrages upon helpless negroes. Any event, therefore, like the Hamburg massacre was a godsend to them, as it would wonderfully advance the interest of Hayes. Now, when we remember that Chamberlain was one of the accredited leaders of his party in South Carolina, and that his power was due to the aid which he could obtain from that party, it is not doing him injustice to presume that he would put no gloss over his report of the massacre so as to relieve the Democratic party from any of the odium which attached to it. The only fault that was apparent in his report is, that

he assigns a cause for the outbreak so trivial and so absurd that men in their senses ought to have called for a more consistent account. But men were not in their senses, and anything that would show the Southerners to be fools and madmen was swallowed by the North with eager credulity. A few facts should be considered before we reach the Governor's report. The affair took place on the night of the 8th. He could not have heard of it before the next day. Instead of going himself, as a Governor should have done, he sent Stover, his Attorney-General, and Purvis, his chief military officer. These men probably reached Hamburg on the 10th, conversed with such persons as they casually saw, found the coroner's inquest at work, and made their report on the 12th, which had this remarkable conclusion: "It may be possible that a judicial investigation may show some slight errors in the minor details stated in this report, but making due allowance for such errors, the facts show the demand on the militia to give up their arms was made by persons without lawful authority to enforce such demand, or to receive the arms had they been surrendered; that the attack on the militia to compel a compliance with this demand was without lawful excuse or justification, and that after there had been some twenty or twenty-five persons completely in their power, five were deliberately shot to death, and three wounded." This report was made by the Attorney-General nearly three weeks before the coroner's inquest was completed.

Now follows the Governor's account in a letter to Senator Robinson: "Two young men—Butler and his brother-in-law, Gatsten—passing through Hamburg in a buggy on the 4th July, encountered a company of militia in the street under parade, commanded by Doc. Adams. The street is over a hundred feet in breadth, and the company was marching in a column of fours. While thus marching, and of course occupying a very small portion of the street, they were met by these two whites, who insisted on keeping their course in the street without regard to the movements of the militia, and drove against the head of the column, which halted. A parley ensued, which ended in the company yielding, opening their ranks, and allowing the young men to proceed on their course.

"For this offence" (so far from offence, this is a report of unusual civility on the part of the negroes) "a complaint was made the following day to Prince Rivers, who discharged the double duty of General and Trial Justice. He sent a summons to Adams to appear before him, but he was not obeyed. Rivers determined to arrest Adams, and the case was adjourned until the 8th. On that day a number of whites

appeared in arms, among whom was Gen. Butler. Rivers again summoned Adams, who again did not come, and Rivers, fearing a collision of races, did not enforce his summons. The whites demanded the surrender of the arms of the militia, who had taken refuge in a brick house, and a conference ensued. At last the whites said that if the arms were not surrendered in half an hour they would fire upon them. To this the negroes replied that the demand was unlawful; that they were necessary for their personal safety, and that they would not give them up. On this the whites commenced firing, and a shot from the building killed Mr. Merriwether. A cannon was then brought from Augusta, and the house battered. The negroes then left the house, and twenty or twenty-five of them fell into the hands of the whites, who killed five of them," as has been already described.

Such, in substance, is the report of Gov. Chamberlain, derived from the report of his Attorney-General, Stover. If the report is true, it warrants all that he said in conclusion as to the character of the act—viz.: that it leads to the supposition that our civilization is but skin deep, and that nothing short of condign and ample punishment can discharge the obligation of society and of the State towards the authors of this causeless and cruel massacre. But the report is lacking in one very essential particular. It does not assign a cause for the events which succeeded the 4th July. The two young men who encountered the militia seemed to have revelled in all the insolence of madmen. In a wide and open street nothing would satisfy them but that particular track which was occupied by the company, which, as they were marching in a column of four, must have been very narrow. With a spirit bent on mischief they drove against the head of this narrow column, insisting that the company should make way for them, and after a brief parley the company yielded. This story is one which any decent young man would blush to hear reported of himself; he would try to forget it and hope it might soon pass into oblivion. But this was not their temper. On the following day they applied to Prince Rivers (whether general or trial magistrate we know not) for redress. Redress for what? Their own unpardonable insolence, or for the cruelty of the militia officers? And when this double functionary was disregarded by Doc. Adams in either his civil or military capacity, another day is appointed for hearing the case, and this time their advisor and counsellor is no less a person than General Butler. Is it possible that he could so far forget his dignity and his character as to be the aider and abettor of young men who had shown so little sense of propriety as they had done?

Men who think must have seen that there was something not reported; that a man like General Butler had too much at stake to become the champion of two hot-headed boys. If the report of Stover and Chamberlain is true, Butler should have counselled them to go home and learn to behave themselves. It is the natural and necessary award of good conduct that when a good man is charged with folly and wickedness, people should call for proof before yielding belief to the charges. But in the temper with which the North regarded the South, the ordinary principles of judgment and of action were laid aside, and it seemed quite natural that the heroic Butler should act the part of a mad boy.

Let us now endeavor to arrive at the truth, and find a cause for the demand for redress which brought on the catastrophe. Our statement is taken from General Butler's letters, and from the testimony elicited on a proceeding on *habeas corpus*. This testimony was given by gentlemen of high character in that locality.

Since the war the town of Hamburg, once a wealthy part of the State, had sunk both in wealth and population, and was a mere colony of negroes. They enjoyed the corporate rights which had been granted to the town, and their council frequently acted both arbitrarily and eccentrically, to the great annoyance of those neighbors who had occasion to visit or pass through the town. Of late a military body had been revived on the basis of one of Scott's companies. This company was in the habit of acting as most of these companies do when not under the moral restraint of the whites, and had at several times been troublesome. It seemed to them right and proper that when their Captain was arrested, whether on civil or military process, to surround him and resist the arrest, and this they did both on the 6th and on the 8th July. Gatsten and young Butler were coming out of Augusta in a buggy on the 4th. Doc. Adams's company was on parade in the street. When they saw the buggy coming they stretched themselves intentionally across the only available space. The street is generally one hundred feet wide, but just here it was so narrow and blocked up by the troops, that there was no course for the buggy to pass. On one side was a ditch, on the other a fence, and in their rear a wall. The insult was open, designed, obstinate and aggressive. The young men were obliged to stop, and whilst they stood still the negroes cursed and villified them in the grossest manner, and beat their drums about the horse's head. If they attempted to pass through any space that seemed open the gap was filled up by the negroes with their bayonets. After this ob-

struction had lasted about fifteen minutes a rain came up and the negroes dispersed. Here, then, was reasonable ground for Mr. Butler to complain. The militia had not only, in violation of the law, obstructed the highway, but had added outrage and insult to the illegal act, and if this company was not a lawful militia the offence was an aggravated one. On the following day Mr. Butler called on Prince Rivers with a complaint against Doc. Adams for forcibly and outrageously hindering him from peaceably pursuing his way through a public street. Mr. Butler, the father of the complainant, lived about two miles from Hamburg, and had occasion, either himself, some of his family or his servants, to pass almost daily through the town. Frequently annoyed at the usage they had received at the hands of these militiamen, he determined to try on this occasion whether the law would not protect him against these repeated annoyances. When, therefore, the case was adjourned to the 8th he sent for General Butler to act as his legal adviser.

On this summons General Butler went to Hamburg. He called on Prince Rivers, but could not learn whether the case was to be a civil or a military one. He seemed to be either unwilling or unable to proceed against the unruly Captain, who had posted himself in a brick house which was used as an armory and drill-room. He was attended by a large body of his men. Several persons (negroes) came to General Butler to offer to accommodate matters, to all of whom he gave ready ear. They went off on their mission of peace, but did not return. General Butler and his client declared distinctly that all that they wanted was that the outrages complained of should not be repeated. While thus waiting for a settlement General Butler went to Augusta on private business, and there in answer to inquiries did not hesitate to declare that matters looked very badly in Hamburg, and that he thought a collision of races was imminent. He asked for no help, though it is not unlikely 'twas his declared opinion induced many to go over. On his return to the town Prince Rivers requested an interview. At first he refused, because Rivers had more than once failed to keep his appointment; but more moderate counsels prevailed and he went. He then told Rivers that Adams's company was not a military body organized under the laws of the State, had no right to the arms in their possession, and that they must be given up and sent to the Governor. Rivers asked Butler whether he would be responsible for their delivery if surrendered. Butler replied in the affirmative, and said that he was willing to give a bond to that effect with any amount of security. Rivers wished to know whether

the men so surrendering their arms would be safe from violence. Butler replied that that would depend on the way they behaved themselves, but that they had no right to the arms and that they must be given up. The conference ended here, and not long afterwards the men in the house began to fire upon the whites. As soon as Merriweather was slain the whites went to Augusta and brought thence a cannon, with which they drove the negroes from the house. As it was very late, General Butler left the place and went to Mr. Robert Butler's, where he spent the night.

Such is the substance of General Butler's statement. In a subsequent letter, called out by Chamberlain's letter to Senator Robertson, he indignantly said: "No man knows better than Chamberlain that what he says in that letter to Robertson is false in every essential particular. No one knows better than himself that he has published it in the bloody-shirt outrage interest." Meanwhile a coroner's inquest, conducted by Prince Rivers, with the assistance of Harmost, was sitting on the case, and continued its sessions until the end of the month. The result of this inquest was a verdict of murder against seven men, and eighty others of being accessory to the murder, and warrants of arrest were served by the sheriff on all who lived in South Carolina of the men thus accused (at least one had been dead several years, two were in California, and one was, on the night in question, confined in the station-house in Augusta). Ten of the jury made their marks on this verdict.

It was prudent on the part of the accused to fortify themselves with testimony in rebuttal of that which had been taken by the coroner, and a mass of sworn testimony was carried before Judge Maher, before whom the accused appeared and demanded to be bailed. From this it was proved that Adams had organized his company in the spring, with the avowed purpose of killing the whites; that for several days before the collision, the negroes had threatened to force a fight; that a white man named Schilber, a Hamburg shopkeeper, had gone to Columbia on the 5th and returned the next day with a tin case of cartridges, which was delivered to the officers of the company; that runners were sent to Beach Island, to Bath Mills, and elsewhere, to call the negroes into Hamburg on the 8th, many of whom obeyed the call; that the negroes had ammunition and a cannon stored in their armory; that Adams, Athony and others had publicly declared their intention to kill out the whites before the election; that the shooting in the night had begun with the negroes, and not a single fire had been returned until Merriweather was killed. It was proved, and



this by the testimony of Prince Rivers himself, that Doc. Adams's company was not a legally organized body, and that they had got possession of their arms irregularly and unlawfully. With affidavits to these facts, made by men of the highest character in the neighborhood, the accused went to Aiken, before Judge Maher, and after some factious and ineffectual opposition by Attorney-General Stover, were discharged on bail. The matter was never brought before a court by that officer. He was too busy manufacturing outrages for the political market to attend to the proper duties of his office. Towards the end of the month the Governor went to Washington, a practice common with our radical governors and judges when trouble of any kind existed. He also wrote a letter to President Grant, which we shall presently give, but it was not published until called for by the House of Representatives.

On the 4th August the Secretary of War ordered that all troops not required to act against the Indians be held in readiness to act in the Southern States, and not long afterwards troops were stationed at Hamburg. It was naturally supposed that this was the result of his late visit to Washington, but the Governor indignantly denied that he had visited Washington with that end in view. He wanted no troops to assist him, and had made no such request. He did not consider the riot at Hamburg as significant of anything more than a mere local affair, the result of bad feeling in a particular locality. A very few days afterwards his letter to the President was made public, and Chamberlain's character for veracity was utterly ruined.

In this letter he declares that the massacre of Hamburg had struck terror into the hearts of the negro, and as it was probably made with a view to the approaching elections, it would have the effect of deterring them from the polls, and he more than insinuates that it was a political move. He says that the demand made by the mob on the militia company for surrendering their arms, with the fact that the militia had not done, nor threatened to do, injury to any one in that community, seems to indicate a purpose to deprive the militia of their rights on account of their color or political associations. Those who made the demand were whites and Democrats. The effect of this act has been to terrorize the blacks and cause some elation among the whites. All the whites are not so bad as those of Edgefield, but their mild disapproval of such outrages does not prevent them, and as political advantages may grow out of them, they overlook the brutality and seek to find some excuse for it. Their intention is to introduce the Mississippi plan into the State. In this state of general



alarm among the negroes, may not the Governor expect help from the President?

President Grant, who a year before had turned a deaf ear to the call of the Governor of Mississippi for help, now when the elections are approaching finds that the rights and liberties of the citizens are in peril, sympathizes deeply with the Governor of South Carolina. In the Hamburg massacre he finds only a repetition of Mississippi violence. He volunteers the opinion that the latter State is governed by a body of officials chosen through fraud and violence such as was scarcely to be accredited to savages, much less to a civilized and Christian people. He closes with a remark the truth and significance of which doubtless did not appear either to himself or to Chamberlain, but which everybody can understand now—a *government that cannot give protection to life, property, and all civil rights is a failure.*

When the leaders give the key note, the masses are sure to follow. On the evening of the 17th July an indignation meeting was held in Charleston, at which the Rev. Cain (Daddy Cain) and the Rev. Adams were conspicuous. Their language was such as this: "*This thing must stop! Remember there are eighty thousand black men in the State able to bear Winchester rifles; and twenty thousand black women who can light the torch or use the knife.* Governor Chamberlain must bring Butler and his clan to justice."

---

Letters from Fort Sumter.

By LIEUTENANT IREDELL JONES, of First Regiment South Carolina Regulars.

FORT SUMTER, August 22, 1863,

*My Dearest Mother,*—The firing continued all day yesterday with unabated fury, no less than 1,000 shots being thrown at us, and to give you an idea of the accuracy, our flag-staff was shot away four times. The firing was concentrated principally on the eastern face, though but little damage was done, save the disabling of two guns. In the evening, the Ironsides came in; and we opened on her with considerable spirit for a short while, until she thought it best to retire. The casualties were few, but one of our best men had his leg shot off and afterwards amputated. General Beauregard came down about dusk, and General Ripley was here also somewhat later. The former, while he appeared highly pleased and confident, could not help displaying a silent wonder and amazement at the ruined and dilapidated

Fort. He says it must be held for one month yet. To-day the firing has been unusually heavy, and, though only one or two casualties, it has resulted in considerable injury to us, in the way of dismounting guns. We have now only four guns fit for immediate service, though these are well protected by sand traverses, and probably will not be hurt at all. Besides, several others are only temporarily disabled, and to-night, when the firing ceases, they can be repaired. One company was sent out of the Fort last night, and to-night another goes. This will leave three to keep the old machine going. Our men act splendidly. No troops probably ever stood with so little concern and for so long a time such a terrific and constant shelling, and the more honor is due to them for such behavior when it is recollected that they do it without being allowed to reply. They have to sit quiet and take it the livelong day. You have no idea what a relief it is at night when the enemy stops pelting us; the feeling is delightful; we feel refreshed and rejoiced, and seem to breathe more freely an air that seems purer.

The eastern face of the Fort is very little injured so far, and the Fort is still tenable, though no one expects it to be held any length of time. The object of holding now is to get time to build or complete batteries on James's Island. Powder is being moved out as rapidly as possible. It is not impossible to save them, but it is probable that the guns will be blown up with the Fort when we evacuate. The Fort is so torn to pieces, and there is so much rubbish in it, that it would be a difficult job to get them out, and would require too much energy for we Confederates. It has come to our ears that the *croakers* have already opened their terrific battery, that never ceases firing. Every gun must be saved, say they, and the Fort must be defended, casemate by casemate, tier by tier, brick by brick! Build a bomb-proof, and get in it, and stay there and never give it up! I wish some of these boys would come down and give us a lift. It is said their *battery never ceases firing*, but I venture to say that if one of these same boys were to come down here and sit with us six hours, his battery would be completely silenced, and he would never open again, though he should live to the age of twice three score and ten.

One of Ripley's fancy aids-de-camp came down the other night with orders to Colonel Rhett to hold the Fort *at all hazards*, and was accidentally forced to remain in the Fort during next day; but he left here as soon as possible, the most disagreeably scared man you ever saw in your life, and I venture a prediction that he won't come back to *this place* any more.

\* \* \* \* \*

Night before last Captain Carlin, with a small steamer made for the purpose, accompanied by a detachment from the Fort under Lieutenant Fickling, went out to blow up the Ironsides. They reached the old monster without the slightest alarm being given, but, unfortunately, instead, of striking her with bow ahead, the tide drifted them round, and the boat struck with its side, the torpedo hanging in some chains on the Ironsides and being torn off and left. They all have frightful stories to relate about the drums beating to quarters, seeing men rush on deck and to their guns, and seeing guns run in battery, and blank cartridges fired. But suffice it to say, that they succeeded in getting off safe, though making a hair-breadth escape. I have told you about Fickling, particularly his height. He is only nineteen years old, but a more gallant fellow never lived. How near he came being immortalized!

IREDELL JONES.

---

FORT SUMTER, August 23, 1863.

*My Dear Father* :—You will have heard, before this reaches you, of the fight with the enemy's monitors this morning. They came up, five in number, about half-past three o'clock and opened on us, in our helpless condition, a most terrific and destructive fire. We had but one solitary gun amid the ruins, the remnant of thirty-five splendid barbette guns, with which to contend against them. They were within 800 yards of the Fort, and could not be seen by the other fortifications on account of the denseness of the fog; so that for some time our single gun was the only one on our side engaged. I could scarcely restrain my tears at our helpless situation. It was a sad reflection indeed to think that all our guns were disabled, and that, too, when we so much needed them, and that we had only one with which to fight the sneaking sea-devils. After awhile, however, Moultrie, Bee, Simpkins, Gregg, all opened, and, after a hot fight of two hours, in which we in the Fort were the only ones to suffer, the enemy thought fit to retire. I need not speak of the injury that we sustained, for we could scarcely be injured more than we already were. The reason of the enemy's appearance this morning was doubtless on account of their belief that the Fort was abandoned; for, before we opened, a launch filled with troops was seen approaching the Fort, and was quite near the wharf when we gave the alarm, whereupon the launch was seen to return hurriedly. The garrison had been ordered previously to turn out with small arms to defend the

ruins against an assault, and when the launch was first discovered it was thought to be a storming party, but it was evidently only a small force to take possession of the Fort. The enemy were doubtless induced to believe that the Fort was evacuated from the fact that no evening gun was fired yesterday—a thing so unusual, and which was caused partly by neglect and partly by an accident.

We have endured another day's hard shelling and pelting. It is now just after dark, and not a sound salutes the ear. The whole harbor seems at rest and quiet; whether *they* are or not, I cannot tell. We look for the monitors to come up again in the morning. How I wish we had something with which to fight them! I was officer of the guard yesterday, and during the fight this morning had to remain at the sally-port with my guard. I had a dangerous post, being in the line of fire, but fortunately escaped untouched. One of my men was killed, and seven negroes, who were taking protection in the casemates with me, were wounded. There were an unusual number of casualties to-day, particularly as to officers. A shell burst just over the mess-room while several officers were at dinner, wounding slightly the Colonel, Adjutant and ordnance officer, together with a negro waiter.

It seems to be the policy of General Beauregard to hold the Fort at all hazards until he gets his fortifications completed on James and Sullivan's Islands, when we will probably be sent to the latter place. I don't think that the enemy will make an assault. If they do, however, they will find it an ugly little job. Our men are in good spirits, though considerably chafed and worried in consequence of the tremendous bombardment that they have been under for seven days. If it is the wish of our Generals that we should remain here and suffer for the good of our country, I hope we will be equal to any danger or hardship that we may be required to endure. I trust the city will be saved, even after Morris' Island and Sumter are abandoned. \* \*

IREDELL JONES.

---

FORT SUMTER, August 25, 1863.

*My Dear Mother* :—It gratified me much to receive your kind letter yesterday evening. It so happened that I read it at the same time that I received the Charleston papers containing the vile, brutal, uncivilized demand of the wretch who commands the Yankee forces in this department, and its pure, pious, trustful spirit, representing the

mothers and daughters of our noble old city, against whom (for it was meant for no others to suffer by it) the atrocious demand was made had the effect to increase, if that were possible, the deep feeling of disgust and revenge that I already harbored in my breast, from witnessing on Saturday morning the unprecedented act that he threatened, actually performed. And now, before God, I vow that if such an act is repeated, and I am ever placed in a situation to take revenge, I shall neither give nor ask quarter, but slaughter every wretch that comes within my power. I know this is a change from the views and principles that I have heretofore entertained; but my principles can have no force when my feelings are so touched. Such an act forewarns us what we may expect at the hands of General Gilmore; and, while it demonstrates his brutality, it demonstrates still more his weakness and recklessness, and however well he has seemingly conducted affairs in this attack, I venture to predict that he is not a man of ability. Beauregard's reply everybody considers excellent. The General can write if he can't fight. The enemy's battery in the marsh, from which the shots were fired on the city, can be seen plainly from here, and has only one gun mounted, and at such a distance (five miles) no one thinks that it can injure the city materially. We cannot imagine any other object that General Gilmore could have had, save malicious spite. He could not have supposed that by firing on the city he would compel the surrender of Morris's Island and Sumter. He is chagrined that he cannot, with his all-powerful combined force, make two poor little batteries crumble before him; that Sumter, though knocked to pieces, still continued to show fight; and that he has expended on the latter alone 100,000 pounds of powder and 1,000,000 pounds of wrought iron. But, though he cannot boast of having whipped us at all, much less in six hours, he cannot *injure* us much more than he has already.

I told you in my last that we had but one serviceable gun. Since then, however, we have rigged up two others that were disabled, which, though the parapet is knocked away in front of both, we expect to fight in case the Ironclads try us again. Colonel Rhett has fully equalled our expectations, as regards being a cool, collected, brave man, and he has certainly acted well in this affair. The Generals tried to make him shoulder the responsibility of abandoning the Fort, the other day, by endeavoring to induce him to say the Fort was untenable; to which he replied that he intended to hold the Fort until he received orders, and that if they refused, on his applying, to give him any, he would then not sacrifice his garrison,

but leave when *he* thought fit. From all I can learn, the Fort is to be held for the present, and now the best guns are being removed. It is a slow and difficult work, however, and it is only at night that we can do anything at all. You may suppose that there is danger, while in a helpless condition, of our being taken prisoners by being cut off, but rest assured that there is not the remotest probability of any such occurrence. You know by this time that I always tell you exactly what I think. We cannot be taken otherwise than by a storming party, and though the Yankees are smart enough to undertake almost any job, I give them credit for being a little *too smart* to take the contract. Probably it would not pay.

*Wednesday Morning.*—Yesterday evening at dusk the enemy made an attack on our rifle pits in front of Wagner, and after a sharp little fight, were repulsed. They have advanced their saps to within 400 yards of the battery. Our loss was six killed and twenty-five wounded.

The firing continued on us all day yesterday, but nothing like so rapidly as previously; and while I write this morning, the firing is going on slowly again. Last night two of our companies were relieved from here and sent to the batteries on James's Island. Their place was supplied by two picked Georgia companies. There are now only two of our own companies in the Fort—Captain Harleston's and Captain Fleming's.       \*       \*       \*       \*       \*

IREDELL JONES.

#### **Military Operations of General Beauregard.**

*By* ALFRED ROMAN.

A REVIEW BY COLONEL WM. ALLAN, FORMERLY CHIEF OF ORD-  
NANCE SECOND CORPS, A. N. V.

This book contains much of interest and value. General Beauregard was one of the highest officers in rank in the Confederate service, and was concerned in many important operations during the civil war. Indeed, few officers on either side had an experience more varied and extensive. The narrative throws light on many of the great junctures of that struggle, and is enriched by a mass of official documents, many of which are here published for the first time. Though there is no little diffuseness and repetition in the book, the arrangement is clear and the style easy and attractive. The care and

labor shown in the preparation, as well as the mass of valuable materials it contains, render this book indispensable to the student of the history of the war.

We regret that we cannot go farther in praise of this book, but its whole tone, temper and manner of composition forbid it. Its faults are too glaring to be overlooked. The chief sufferer from its publication is likely to be General Beauregard himself, and it had been better for his reputation if he had assumed less directly the responsibility for Colonel Roman's work. The book is not so much a history of General Beauregard's career as it is a fulsome panegyric of him, an overstrained and often disingenuous defence of everything he did, or did not do, during the war, and an unfair and ill-natured critique upon the conduct of his superiors. We believe there is not a single superior officer of General Beauregard that is not disparaged in this book, and accused of damaging, at one time or another, the cause of which General Beauregard is represented as the only ever wise and ever unselfish defender. The object of our author's special hostility is Mr. Davis, but the Confederate Secretaries of War, the chiefs of the war bureaus in Richmond, and Generals Cooper, Lee, A. S. Johnston, J. E. Johnston, besides many of lower rank, come in for their share of criticism—a criticism often ill-judged, in most cases partial, and nearly always truculent.

The author's mode of dealing with history is illustrated by his account of the first battle of Manassas. The facts in regard to this are simple. In July, 1861, the Confederate Government had two principal bodies of troops, hastily collected, to oppose the invasion of Virginia, threatened by the as hastily gathered levies of the Federal Government. The larger of these, under General Beauregard, held the line of Bull Run, and in its front was the principal Federal army under General McDowell. Beauregard's force was being augmented by new regiments as fast as they could be armed and equipped out of the meagre supplies the South could then command, and by the middle of July numbered about 20,000 men. The other Confederate army, of about 10,000 men, under General J. E. Johnston, was opposing General Patterson's advance into the Shenandoah Valley. Besides these, General Holmes had a small force on the lower Potomac. Both of the larger bodies were greatly inferior to the Federal forces opposing them. McDowell had about 35,000 men and Patterson about 20,000. As McDowell's was the principal Federal army, it was pretty clear that the first serious advance would be made by it. It was also evident that the Confederate forces at Manassas would



not grow fast enough to place it on an equality with the army in its front, and therefore General Beauregard suggested the expediency of uniting the forces of Johnston and Holmes with his own for a sudden attack upon the Federal armies in succession. This proposal Beauregard submitted through one of his staff to Mr. Davis on the night of July 14. Generals Cooper and Lee were called in conference by Mr. Davis. The plan required that General Johnston, who was seventy-five miles away, should leave 5,000 men to hold Patterson in check, and rapidly join Beauregard with 20,000. This would double the Confederate force at Manassas and make it superior to McDowell, who was to be attacked and beaten. Then Johnston was to return with his own and 10,000 of Beauregard's men and overwhelm Patterson. Beauregard thought a week would suffice for this, after which Johnston was to reinforce Garnett in West Virginia and destroy McClellan. Then Johnston's and Garnett's forces were to cross the Potomac and attack Washington in rear, while Beauregard assailed it in front. This scheme was rejected as impracticable by all present at the conference, because: 1, Johnston had hardly 10,000 men, instead of 25,000, which Beauregard's plan assumed; 2, McDowell's army was too close to Washington to permit of its being crushed in the way indicated. If pressed, it could readily fall back to that city and its reserves. Another reason General Beauregard might himself have added: neither of the Confederate armies was supplied with transportation or stores sufficient for the complicated movements mapped out.

On July 17, the third day after this conference, McDowell advanced, and Beauregard telegraphed the fact and asked for reinforcements. Johnston was then ordered to join him if practicable with his effective force, and Holmes was also sent up. Next day occurred Tyler's attempt at Mitchell's Ford, ending in a Federal repulse. Beauregard's report apparently caused the Confederate authorities to think that McDowell had been severely checked, for next day (19th) Beauregard was telegraphed as follows: "We have no intelligence from General Johnston. If the enemy in front of you has abandoned an immediate attack, and General Johnston has not moved, you had better withdraw the call upon him, so that he may be left to his full discretion." \* \* \* Beauregard, seeing that the Federal army in front was only perfecting its plans for attack, of course did not stop Johnston, who reached Manassas on the 20th, followed by his troops during that night and the next day. As Johnston had merely eluded Patterson, who must soon learn of his movement,



both Confederate Generals felt that no time was to be lost in fighting McDowell. Johnston was senior, and in command, but, having no time to learn the country or disposition of the troops, adopted Beauregard's plan of attacking McDowell at Centreville next day (21st). The aggressive movements of the Federals early on the 21st prevented the execution of this plan. Beauregard then proposed to check McDowell's movement against the left by attacking with the Confederate right. This, too, was approved and adopted, but the orders sent by General Beauregard failed to reach the Confederate right in time. Meantime McDowell had turned the Confederate left and was pressing back with overwhelming force the troops there stationed. All plans of aggression were now abandoned in order to resist McDowell's attack, and a battle, unforeseen in character, location and disposition of troops, ensued. Both Generals hastened to the point of danger and exerted themselves successfully to stay the progress of the Federals. Johnston then left Beauregard in command of the troops engaged, and, taking a position with reference to the whole field, devoted himself to hastening forward reinforcements. These came up so promptly that Beauregard, taking advantage of the check which Jackson's stubborn stand had wrought, was soon able to resume the offensive, and within a short time the Federals were not only defeated but routed and driven with fearful panic across Bull Run.

Mr. Davis reached the field after the battle was over, and that night, when the panic of the Federal army had become partially known, was anxious for an immediate advance toward Washington. Both Generals thought this inadvisable, so great was the exhaustion and confusion in the Confederate ranks produced by the battle, and so inadequate the stock of supplies and transportation then available. On the night of the 22d, at another conference, the Generals declared it was impracticable to cross the Potomac or to advance at once on Washington in the wake of the defeated army. Mr. Davis seems to have been satisfied with the propriety of this judgment, and the idea was abandoned.

Such are the facts. Let us see what Colonel Roman makes of them. On the rather slim basis of the reduction of Fort Sumter, General Beauregard's skill and reputation are spoken of in the most extravagant terms. He then describes the proposal of July 14 as a stroke of genius, and says: "A high tribunal, composed of the President, Generals Cooper and Lee, took upon itself to check and render barren the strategic powers so greatly developed in General Beaure-

gard, and in which the immortal Jackson alone is acknowledged to have been his peer." Over and over again, with tiresome iteration, are Davis, Cooper and Lee denounced for not committing themselves without hesitation to a scheme utterly impracticable as Beauregard put it, since it assumed nearly three times as many troops with Johnston as he actually had. Had the troops been at hand, half-drilled, inexperienced, badly equipped, with insufficient transportation, as they were, the chances of success would not have been more than one in one hundred, and there is nothing in General Beauregard's subsequent career to lead to the conviction that he was the man to seize that single chance. Again, the dispatch of the 19th is tortured to mean a withdrawal of assent to the union of Johnston and Beauregard, and the latter is highly praised for pocketing the dispatch and thus insuring the junction of the two forces, while Mr. Davis is unsparingly condemned for sending it. The dispatch shows for itself. Johnston was not to be stopped unless McDowell had abandoned his immediate attack, and even then discretion was left with Johnston (the senior officer) as to his movements. McDowell had not abandoned his attack, and therefore Beauregard did simply his duty in holding the dispatch. Colonel Roman goes on to say :

"We assert it as an incontrovertible truth, fully proved by later events, that the President of the Confederacy, by neglecting to compel his Quartermaster-General to procure the transportation which could have been easily procured more than a month before the battle of Manassas ; by refusing, as early as the 13th of June, to assent to General Beauregard's urgent request that authority should be given to concentrate our forces at the proper moment at Manassas Junction ; by again refusing, on the 15th of July, to allow him to execute his bold, offensive plans against the enemy, the certain result of which would have been the taking of Washington—that the President of the Confederacy, by thus persisting in these three lamentable errors, *lost the South her independence.*"

It is hard to know how to characterize this wild statement seriously. That the Quartermaster and Commissary, as well as all other departments of the Confederate Government and army, were new and in many respects inefficient, was certainly the case ; but probably no country without any military establishment or central government, and peopled by citizens untrained to war for generations, ever acted with greater energy than did the South in the three months between the opening of the war and the battle of Manassas in raising and supplying armies. The victory of Manassas is itself one of the best

proofs of this. General Beauregard is entitled to a large share of credit for this remarkable victory, and we think this has been accorded to him; but it must have been under some malign star that he allowed his biographer to make such claims as we have quoted.

There is no better commentary to be found upon the claim that General Beauregard was prevented from taking Washington and thus perhaps ending the war, than in Beauregard's own action after Manassas. Colonel Roman's claim is that if Johnston had been ordered to join Beauregard on July 15th, McDowell would have been overthrown, and next Patterson, and next, perhaps, McClellan, and that then Washington might have fallen before the Confederates advancing on both sides of the Potomac. Well, Johnston *was* ordered to join Beauregard with his whole force on July 17, and eluding Patterson with great skill he reached Manassas in time to secure a victory over McDowell, a victory one of the most thorough and complete upon record. This was in accordance with General Beauregard's programme. What then became of the rest of that plan? We do not hear that Beauregard urged the return of Johnston to demolish Patterson and McClellan, and Colonel Roman informs us distinctly that Beauregard opposed any advance on Washington at the time and declared it impracticable. Now, no one can show that General Beauregard could have reasonably expected more favorable conditions, had Johnston joined him two days earlier, than were actually at the command of the Confederate leaders after their victory. Yet he saw then that it was impossible to carry out the scheme he had proposed. It would be perhaps unkind and unfair to Beauregard to say he ought to have seen this before the proposition was made, but surely, to speak of Colonel Roman's course as unkind and unfair, in bitterly denouncing Beauregard's superiors twenty years after the above facts became known, is to characterize that course but mildly.

Our author continues in the same strain in regard to Beauregard's position on the field of Manassas, about which there is no proper room to doubt. He was second in command under Johnston, who adopted his plans until McDowell's advance checkmated them, when each in his sphere did his best to secure success—Beauregard as commander of the troops engaged, and Johnston as commander-in-chief. After the battle Johnston was strongly opposed to advancing, and so, too, was Beauregard for a time. But Colonel Roman, through many pages, labors to prove that Johnston had nothing to do with the battle of Manassas except to act as a dead weight upon Beauregard.

A similar tone pervades the whole book. When General Beaure-

gard is sent to the West, he finds everything wrong in General A. S. Johnston's department. The line of defence has been badly chosen, the works to strengthen it have been laid out without judgment, the vital importance of the defence of the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers has not been foreseen or properly provided for. General Beauregard promptly proposes a plan of operations to counteract these blunders. It is not adopted, and hence follow, in his opinion, the fall of Donelson and the subsequent disasters of the Confederates. Again, it is General Beauregard who, in spite of the indifference or opposition of his Government, and without the aid of his commanding officer, collects and organizes an army at Corinth, urges and finally induces General Johnston to unite his forces with it, and plans and does everything about the battle of Shiloh—except to fight it. General Beauregard is made to stand out as a solitary rock in a sea of incompetency and petty jealousy. Yet when the chief command devolved upon Beauregard, by the death of Johnston, he no doubt realized more fully how much easier it was to criticize the shortcomings of others than to master the tremendous difficulties which beset the Confederate Government and its Generals in the field. A great victory was just within the grasp of the Confederates. It was allowed to slip away from them. Next day the tables were turned, and Beauregard was forced to retire to Corinth. Weeks followed, during which not a single stroke by the Confederates checked the onward progress of the Federal arms in the West. Beauregard's strategy consisted in waiting at Corinth until the advance of the Federal army made a retreat necessary. He then fell back to Tupelo.

Again we find it impossible to sympathize with the violent attacks made upon the Confederate administration in connection with the controversies in which General Beauregard's ideas of official propriety sometimes involved him. Most remarkable, however, is the complaint made about his removal from command after his retreat from Corinth. The Confederate army had just fallen back before overwhelming forces, the Mississippi seemed about to fall into Federal hands. It was the first of June, when the Union armies might be expected to push their advantage with increasing vigor. At this juncture, without conference, and without any notice beyond a telegraphic dispatch to his Government, General Beauregard proposed to leave his army, on a surgeon's certificate, to seek rest and recuperation at a distant watering-place. General Bragg, the next officer in rank, had been ordered elsewhere by his Government, but General Beauregard retained him, turned over the command to him,

and actually left his post for the purpose indicated. The Richmond authorities promptly relieved Beauregard and placed Bragg permanently in command. It is hard to see how so intelligent a soldier as Colonel Roman can complain of this, but he does. General Beauregard's sickness was not sudden or unforeseen. It was a trouble he had been suffering from for months. Either he was fit to command his army or he was not. If not, no injustice was done. But in either case, the Richmond authorities should have been informed, and the step of turning over the command to the next in rank not entered upon without conference with and approval by them. It will be hard to convince anyone that at the first of June, and in the circumstances that then surrounded the western army, General Beauregard was justified on the plea of ill-health and that his presence was not important, in leaving his post for a contemplated absence of some weeks without waiting to learn the views of his Government.

Colonel Roman's book is so filled with indiscriminate praise of General Beauregard, and indiscriminate blame of nearly everybody else, that we are apt to lose sight of General Beauregard's really brilliant achievements. It is far more pleasant to contemplate these than to read Colonel Roman's incessant criticisms of distinguished Confederates, whose sacrifices for the land of their birth were not less costly, whose conduct was not less unselfish, whose patriotism was as devoted, whose aims were as high, whose courage was as marked as General Beauregard's, and whose ability and skill were certainly not inferior to those of the distinguished Louisianian.

General Beauregard was assigned to the command of South Carolina and Georgia in September, 1862, his most important duty being the defence of Charleston. Here General Beauregard had a field eminently adapted to his talents. A most skillful and accomplished engineer, he not only displayed ability of the highest order in this memorable defence, but exhibited astonishing fertility of resource and tenacity of purpose. At the end of January, 1863, the Confederate gunboats made such a descent upon the blockading squadron as to cripple it and drive it off for the time. Early in April the Federal fleet, under Dupont, made the first grand attack upon Fort Sumter, but was beaten off with terrible loss. Again in July a most formidable armament, equipped with the best means at the command of the Federal Government, and under one of the best engineers in the old army, General Gillmore, began a most determined and protracted attack upon the defences of Charles-

ton. With comparatively slender means Beauregard completely baffled and kept at bay the prodigious armament with which the Federal Government sought to reduce the "cradle of secession." For nearly six months his works sustained a fire which has rarely, if ever, been excelled in persistence and weight of metal. When Fort Sumter had become simply a heap of rubbish he continued to hold it and to defeat every attempt on the part of his assailants to capture it. At the end of the year the Federals gave up in despair, and the Confederate flag continued to float over Fort Sumter until Sherman's march northwards from Savannah, in the early part of 1865, compelled the evacuation of the city. There is probably in modern warfare no more splendid instance of a skilful and determined defence than that of Charleston, and it will ever remain a noble testimony to the ability of Beauregard.

In the Spring of 1864, General Beauregard was called from Charleston, with a large part of his forces, to Richmond and Petersburg, to take part in the defence of the Confederate Capital. Here, General Beauregard's achievements were such as to add deservedly to his reputation. He saved the Southern approaches to Richmond and, perhaps, that city itself, by defeating and "bottling up" Butler at Bermuda Hundred. But his greatest feat in this campaign was his defence of Petersburg on June the 15th, 16th, and 17th. General Grant managed his crossing of the James so well as to deceive General Lee for some days and to keep him in ignorance of his real design. In this way Grant succeeded in throwing a large part of the Federal army against Petersburg, before General Lee reached there with the advance of his army on June 18. Beauregard meantime held the defences of Petersburg, and made a brilliant and tenacious struggle for them. He managed his small force with such skill and courage as to keep back the half of the Federal army, and though forced from his advanced positions he saved the city, and placed his troops on the lines which the Army of Northern Virginia was to defend with such wonderful pluck for more than nine months thereafter.

We have not space to follow General Beauregard's career in the West in connection with Hood's disastrous campaign, or his operations in Sherman's front in the spring of 1865, until General J. E. Johnston was placed in command. There was nothing done on either of these fields, however, that could add to the reputation which General Beauregard won at Charleston and Petersburg.

Letter from General Lee to President Davis.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,

July 29, 1863.

*His Excellency Jefferson Davis,*

*President of the Confederate States:*

*Mr. President,*—Your letter of the 21st instant has been received, and I am much obliged to you for the suggestions it contains. As soon as I receive an official account of the casualties in the army it will be forwarded. The list of our wounded and missing I know will be large. Many of the first could not be moved and had to be left behind. The latter will be swelled by the stragglers, who commenced, on crossing the Potomac, to stray from the line of march, and were intercepted by the enemy's cavalry and armed citizens, notwithstanding every effort which was made to prevent it. Our people are so little liable to control that it is difficult to get them to follow any course not in accordance with their inclinations. The day after the last battle at Gettysburg, on sending back the train with the wounded it was reported that about 5,000 well men started back at night to overtake it. I fear most of these were captured by the enemy's cavalry and armed citizens who beset their route. These added to other stragglers, men captured in battle, and those of the wounded unfit to be transported, will swell our list of missing, and as far as I can judge the killed, wounded and missing from the time we left the Rappahannock until our return will not fall short of 20,000. This comprises, however, the slightly wounded and those who straggled from the ranks, who are now rejoining us. After recrossing the Potomac I commenced to consolidate the troops, considering the cases individually, and united Archer's and Heth's (Field's) former brigade under General H. H. Walker, and Pender's and Heth's divisions under General Heth. The accession of convalescents and stragglers is enlarging these divisions so much that I shall have to separate them again.

As regards General Davis's brigade, I think it will be better to attach the three Mississippi regiments to Posey's brigade, in Anderson's division, where I hope they will soon be increased in numbers. The North Carolina regiment of this brigade I suggest be attached to Pettigrew's old brigade.

The only objection to this plan is that it breaks up General Davis's command; but if his indisposition will detain him long from the field,



it will be best to do it, for the present at least. Although our loss has been so heavy, which is a source of constant grief to me, I believe the damage to the enemy has been as great in proportion. This is shown by the feeble operations since. Their army is now massed in the vicinity of Warrenton, along the Orange and Alexandria railroad, collecting reinforcements. Unfortunately, their means are greater than ours, and I fear when they move again they will much outnumber us. Their future plans I cannot discover, and think it doubtful, with their experience of last year, whether they will assume the Fredericksburg line again or not, though it is very probable. Should they do so, I doubt the policy of our resuming our former position in rear of Fredericksburg, as any battle fought there, except to resist a front attack, would be on disadvantageous terms, and I therefore think it better to take a position farther back. I should like your views upon this point. The enemy now seems to be content to remain quiescent, prepared to oppose any offensive movement on our part. General Meade's headquarters are at Warrenton. I learn by our scouts that the seven corps are between that point and the Orange and Alexandria railroad. They are all much reduced in numbers. From the observation of some corps, the report of citizens and their prisoners, the reduction is general, and the corps do not exceed from 6,000 to 8,000 men. I have halted Ewell's corps on Robinson's River, about three miles in front of Madison Courthouse, where grazing is represented to be very fine, and in the vicinity of which sufficient flour can be obtained. We have experienced no trouble from the enemy in crossing the Blue Ridge. Except the attempt at Manassas Gap upon Ewell, and of a cavalry force on the Gourd Vine road on A. P. Hill, our march has been nearly unmolested. Our cavalry is in our front along the Rapahannock. I am endeavoring to collect all the provisions I can in this part of the country, which was also done in the Valley. While there, in order to obtain sufficient flour, we were obliged to send men and horses, thresh the wheat, carry it to the mills and have it ground. There is little or no grain in that vicinity, and I cannot learn of more in Madison than sufficient for Ewell's corps.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. LEE, *General.*



**Incidents of Prison Life at Camp Douglas—Experience of Corporal J. G. Blanchard.**

*By* REV. WILLIAM G. KEADY.

[The following interesting narrative is from the pen of a gallant soldier who lost an arm while serving in the trenches at Vicksburg, and whose empty sleeve tells as eloquently of his devotion to the Confederate cause as his voice now pleads the cause of the "Prince of Peace"]:

Amongst the prisoners captured at Island No. 10, and sent to Camp Douglas, Illinois, in April, 1862, was Corporal J. G. Blanchard, of the celebrated Pointe Coupee Battery, of Louisiana. Though then barely seventeen years of age, he had already been over a year in active service; and the restless activity, untiring energy, and unbounded enthusiasm characterizing his course from the time of his entry into service, bespoke unmistakably of how lively he would make matters if circumscribed for an indefinite term within the boundaries of a prison camp. When the news of the capture of his native city reached Chicago, restraint broke loose, and his one expressed determination was to escape from prison and rejoin the Southern army.

For several days his efforts were bent towards effecting a quiet escape. Realizing, however, the impossibility of so doing, he determined on an attempt at any hazard, and on a dark and stormy night, early in May, he scaled the lofty fence inclosing the camp, within a few feet of the sentinel, the report of whose gun drew upon him the concentrated fire of half a dozen more, so incessant were the lightning flashes at the time. Having reached the outside walk, without a moment's hesitation he walked to the very gate of the prison camp, where all was excitement, and entered a street car which was just starting for the city.

Whilst the Federal soldiers were roaming for miles and miles around Camp Douglas in seach of young Blanchard, he was enjoying the comforts of a Chicago hotel, busying himself in the meanwhile in ascertaining the best method of leaving the city and returning South. The second day after his escape he met a former acquaintance who professed the deepest solicitude for his escape, and offered to further the same by every means in his power.

The next day he became suddenly convinced of his supposed

friend's treachery, and immediately took passage on a two-masted vessel bound for Buffalo, N. Y. Arrived at Detroit, Mich., the vessel was boarded by a military officer, who called on the captain for the delivery of "that New Orleans boy." The captain, ignorant of Blanchard's antecedents, and never for a moment suspecting that he was an escaped prisoner, denied having such a passenger aboard, and seemed paralyzed when the Federal officer exclaimed, "There he is!" pointing at the same time to the young man, who was standing near the wheelman, in doubt whether to jump overboard and attempt to swim to the Canada shore. Under guard of the Federal officer he was taken to jail and placed in a cell. The captain of the vessel, at the same time, was released on his parole that he would appear at the jail the following morning.

It happened that young Blanchard was the only prisoner in the jail at the time, and no sooner had the Federal officer departed than the jailor, without any cause or provocation, commenced abusing and vilifying his prisoner. This unexpected assault so angered Blanchard that he challenged the jailor to open the cell door and dare to repeat his insults. The jailor then left, but returned in a short while accompanied by another man, and having opened the cell door, pistol in hand, ordered Blanchard to stand up. His hands were then pinned behind his back with handcuffs, and he was ordered to sit down, and shackles were then riveted to his legs just above the ankle. In this condition he lay on the bare bench of his cell all night. The following morning, on the arrival of the Federal officer and the captain of the vessel, the shackles were taken off, but the officer refused to take off the handcuffs, for the reason that he had received a telegram from the commanding officer at Chicago to keep the prisoner handcuffed.

At about 10 o'clock the same day, under the escort of a company of infantry, Blanchard was taken to the United States Court to give testimony in regard to the assistance rendered to him by the captain of the vessel. It is needless to say that his testimony secured the honorable discharge of the captain, who, in solemn earnestness, implored the judges to have the handcuffs removed from the youth. The court, however, disclaimed jurisdiction in the matter, and Blanchard was brought back to Chicago in handcuffs. Here he was incarcerated in the celebrated White Oak dungeon, in Camp Douglas, where he remained for some forty days.

Immediately after his liberation from the dungeon he set to work to escape again, and on the fifth day thereafter he proposed to make

an attempt. The time selected was 1 o'clock in the afternoon, and the ruse adopted was to feign a fight between two Confederate prisoners, which, experience had shown, would be sure to draw some of the guards away from their beat. At such a deserted beat Blanchard successfully scaled and cleared the fence, and was about fleeing to the lake shore when he heard a heavy thud and a groan behind him. Looking back he discovered a fellow-prisoner (not a soldier), by name Carico, lying on the ground apparently unable to rise. When Blanchard took hold of him to assist him Carico groaned again and said he was badly hurt. In a few minutes the guards were again on their beat, a plank fence alone between them and the two prisoners.

Realizing the danger of attempting even to crawl away from the fence, lest the crackling of a dry twig should betray them to the guard, Blanchard lay alongside of Carico, waiting for night to approach, when they could take advantage of the tramp of the relief guard to deaden the sound of their footsteps as they proceeded to the lake shore. But when the relief came, at 7 P. M., Carico was unable to move, so great was his suffering; and at his earnest solicitation Blanchard agreed to remain with him until the next relief, at 9 o'clock. At half-past 8, however, they were startled by the discovery of a corporal's guard approaching them, the corporal holding a lighted lantern. Hoping that the course of the march of the guard would take them some distance from the fence, Blanchard and Carico lay perfectly quiet; but when about ten feet from the spot where they lay the corporal incidentally held his light toward the fence, the glare of which revealed the two prisoners. Quickly the guns of the guard were levelled at them; but Blanchard exclaiming immediately, "Don't shoot, boys—man badly hurt here," the guns were brought back to a carry, and the corporal approached the prisoners. Finding that Carico was seriously hurt, a litter was sent for and he was carried to the hospital, whilst Blanchard was once again taken to the White Oak.

The third day after his reincarceration three Federal deserters and a renegade Confederate of the Third Tennessee Regiment were also confined in the White Oak. It was proposed by the deserters to effect an escape by tunneling to the outside of the fence, about twelve feet distant, if a knife could be procured; which, being converted into a saw, would enable them to cut a hole in the floor of a dungeon. The knife was procured through one of Blanchard's friends, and in less than six hours a hole, eighteen inches square, was cut into the floor. The digging was accomplished with a spade (which

was one of the appurtenances of the dungeon), and the tunneling with pocket-knives, spoons and forks. One man worked at a time, by turns. When the officer of the guard visited the dungeon, morning and evening, a blanket was spread over the hole, the prisoners engaging in a game of cards seated on the edge of the blanket.

For three days and nights they worked like beavers. Foremost in the labor was Busy Bill, the renegade; he did yeoman's work. On the evening of the third day, realizing that but a few hours' more work would enable them to breathe the air of freedom, it was proposed to suspend work at 6 o'clock, and to resume at 9 o'clock, which would bring the hour of escape at about the dead of night. At about 8 o'clock, however, Busy Bill was apparently taken with violent paroxysms, and so intense seemed his suffering, that the Sergeant of the Guard was asked to take him up out of the dungeon and do something for him.

A few minutes after he was taken up the Sergeant of the Guard came down into the dungeon, and remarking, "Boys, your game is up—Busy Bill gave it away," walked up to where the hole was covered and kicked the blanket away. Busy Bill had actually betrayed his companions in the hope, doubtless, of some reward, which he received in the shape of a merciless castigation when he was returned to the dungeon. So badly was he beaten by his fellow-prisoners that he had to be sent to the hospital.

A few days afterward Blanchard was taken from the dungeon and ordered to clean the quarters of the Federal officers with bucket and swab. This he peremptorily declined to do, notwithstanding the Provost Marshal drew his pistol the second time he gave the order. He was then marched to the quarters of the commanding officer, who, after hearing the statement of the Provost Marshal, exclaimed: "Is it 'that New Orleans boy?' Take him to the Black Hole, and starve him until he will work."

The Black Hole was an iron-clad cell, three feet by six. Thus confined, Blanchard remained two days and nights, without a morsel to eat, being visited morning and evening by the Provost Marshal, who would merely remark, "Are you going to work?" On the morning of the third day Blanchard was taken out of the Black Hole and marched to the Colonel's quarters, and being told that he was brought out at the request of several citizens merely to be given a chance to save his own life, the question was put to him sternly by the Colonel, "Will you or will you not work?" His answer was simply, "Never!" He was ordered to be taken back to the Black

Hole, whence he expected to come out again only "as a corpse," as he had been threatened; but, to his amazement, he was released a few hours after and returned to his mess.

The cartel for a general exchange of prisoners was soon thereafter effected, but Blanchard was destined for another exploit before taking leave of Camp Douglas. Through the instrumentality of some of the Federal officers who had taken quite a fancy to him, he was employed to do clerical work at headquarters regarding the exchange of prisoners. At this time, through the kindness of sympathizers in Chicago, he was enabled to dress in first-class citizens' clothes, in which garb he was not recognized as "a rebel" by the mass of prisoners. It happened that whilst alone in the office he was accosted by a ragged prisoner, who, mistaking Blanchard for some Federal officer, stated that he wanted to take the oath. Blanchard questioned him as to his name, command, etc., and finally asked him why he had joined the Confederate army. The soldier replied that he had been forced into the service. As the regiment to which he belonged was among the first volunteers, Blanchard knew that this statement was false, and, springing from his seat he sent the soldier sprawling out of the room into the hallway, and as the astounded prisoner started to rise he was assisted by a vigorous kick which sent him headlong out of the hall-door into the arms of a Federal officer who was just entering. It is needless to say that for this well-merited chastisement of a renegade Blanchard once more visited the White Oak, whence he emerged only to be sent South.

The writer had no personal knowledge of Blanchard's military career after the exchange, as the latter received a commission in the Provisional army on his arrival at Vicksburg, and was ordered to the army of Tennessee. In 1864, however, we heard of him as Inspector-General on the staff of Major-General Cheatham, during the Georgia campaign, being severely wounded at Kennesaw Mountain. He was undoubtedly the youngest officer holding so high a position in the Confederate army. After Hood's defeat at Nashville he was ordered on detached service on the Mississippi river, where the writer met him once more, and remained with his command until his surrender at Jackson, Miss., in May, 1865. He is now living in New Orleans, as retired and quiet in civil life as he was dashing and enthusiastic in war.

W. G. K.

Operations from the 6th to the 11th of May, 1864—Report of General B. R. Johnson.

HEADQUARTERS JOHNSON'S BRIGADE,  
DREWRY'S BLUFF, May 31, 1864.

*Captain T. O. Chestney, A. A. G.:*

*Sir*,—I submit the following report of the operations of the troops under my command on the southside of James river from the 6th to the 11th May, 1864, inclusive :

At 3 A. M. on the 6th instant I arrived at Drewry's Bluff from Chaffin's farm with my brigade, numbering in the aggregate 1,168 officers and men present, and occupied Fort Stevens. About 5 A. M. a part of the Twenty-first South Carolina regiment of Hagood's brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Dargan, arrived, and was placed in position. While making a personal examination of the adjacent country a dispatch from Major-General Ransom, commanding department, was received by my Assistant Adjutant-General, ordering Hagood's brigade to proceed immediately to Port Walthall junction, by rail, if there was a train to carry it. There being no train at the station, some three or four dispatches were exchanged in my absence by my Assistant Adjutant-General ; during which correspondence the detachment of the Twenty-first South Carolina regiment marched for Port Walthall junction.

About 11 A. M. the following dispatch was handed to me in person :

RICHMOND, May 6, 1864.

*Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson :*

I am astonished Hagood's brigade is not now at Port Walthall junction. March it, and if necessary to stop the enemy, your own, too, as quickly as possible to that point. The railroad must not fall into the enemy's hands. Rapidity is necessary. Act at once. If the enemy be at Port Walthall dislodge him.

[Signed]

R. RANSOM, *Major-General.*

This was the first intimation I had that the enemy was threatening the railroad. I immediately put my brigade in motion, and had advanced to within about two miles of the junction when I received the

following dispatch from Major F. A. Smith, commanding at Drewry's Bluff :

*General*,—Our scouts report the enemy at Ware Bottom church, six miles hence. I have already sent couriers to you with this intelligence. Had you not best return, as the Yankees have burnt houses on the river and the fleet is advancing?

[Signed]

F. A. SMITH, *Major Commanding.*

As everything was quiet in the direction of Port Walthall junction, I halted my command, sent a staff officer to communicate with Lieutenant-Colonel Dargan, now at the junction, and endeavored to obtain further information of the movements of the enemy.

About 5 P. M. I heard firing at Walthall junction, and immediately put my brigade in motion for that place. On reaching the junction I learned that Colonel R. F. Graham had arrived at that place from Petersburg at about 4½ P. M. with the remaining companies of the Twenty-first and three companies of the Twenty-fifth South Carolina regiments, and with this command of about 600 men that he had encountered a brigade or more of the enemy with two pieces of artillery, and drove them gallantly from the field. Their skirmishers at dark were still on the skirt of the woods southeast of the junction. The report of Colonel R. F. Graham is forwarded herewith. I immediately occupied the railroad excavation just southwest of the junction with my brigade, placing skirmishers in front, Colonel Graham's command occupying a position on my left and front. During the night the remainder of the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-seventh South Carolina regiments, with their brigade commander (Brigadier-General Hagood), arrived. Major-General D. H. Hill, of General Beauregard's staff, reached the junction in the morning, and by his skill, counsel, and active supervision throughout the period of those operations, contributed in an eminent degree to the success attained.

At daylight on the 7th instant it was ascertained that the enemy had entirely retired from our immediate front. Through scouts we learned that their forces were in the vicinity of Ware Bottom Church and at Cobb's farm. For the most reliable information I was indebted to Roger A. Pryor; who was active, tireless and daring in reconnoissance. At about 10 o'clock it was resolved to advance towards the church, with a view to feel the strength and position of the



enemy. General Hagood was ordered to move in front, with Johnson's brigade in support. The head of the column had not advanced more than a mile, when General Hill, who had gone to the front to make a personal examination, returned and reported the enemy's cavalry advancing immediately upon us, at about 300 yards' distance from our column. General Hagood was directed to bring his leading regiment into line and advance its skirmishers. Subsequently another regiment was advanced and formed on a line with the first. These regiments were for nearly an hour engaged in a sharp skirmish with the enemy.

The movements of the enemy's infantry seeming to indicate a purpose to flank these regiments on their left, they were retired to our line of battle on the railroad.

In the meantime the enemy had shown in considerable force in two lines—four regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery—in front of our right, near the house of Mrs. Dunn. Skirmishers from Colonel Graham's regiment were advanced to attract the attention of this force, and a section of Hankins's battery, supported by two regiments of Johnson's brigade, was advanced under cover of the woods on the right of Port Walthall railroad to fire on the enemy's infantry. A few rounds from the artillery drove the infantry under cover of adjacent grounds. The fire of the artillery appearing no longer effective, and the movement of the enemy indicating a purpose to make a general attack, I thought it best to procure a compact line; consequently our artillery and infantry were withdrawn to the line of the railroad. The enemy soon appeared in two lines on the open grounds and skirting the woods on the high grounds east of the junction and of Ashton Creek, fronting Hagood's brigade, stationed on my left. At the same time they also reappeared in their original force in the vicinity of Mrs. Dunn's house, threatening Johnson's brigade, on my right. Aided by General Hill, I placed two pieces of artillery on the left of Craig House to open on the enemy in the vicinity of Mrs. Dunn's, and four pieces behind the railroad, or west of it, near the water-tank, to play upon the enemy's infantry east of Ashton Creek. Subsequently one of these latter pieces was removed to a piece of high ground further north, on the south side of the railroad, affording a more direct fire on the enemy. Two other guns which came to the junction were manned with uninstructed convalescents and men on furlough picked up in Petersburg, who deserted their pieces before they fired a shot. These I caused to be manned by men from the Tennessee brigade and placed



on the hill on the turnpike west of the railroad. The forces in front of Johnson's brigade contented themselves with threatening our right and firing artillery at the batteries and infantry in vicinity of Craig's house. Those on the east of Ashton Creek opened about 2 P. M. with artillery and infantry fire, to which we replied very successfully, so that they for a time seemed about to withdraw, and the firing ceased.

General Hagood was instructed to cover the turnpike with his left regiment. After some delay this was accomplished by the foresight and interposition of General Hill, just in time to meet the second line of the enemy, which had been moved under cover of the woods by the right flank, and now appeared bearing down on and flanking Hagood's left. General Hagood now changed the front of his left regiment so as to meet the enemy on his left. In this movement this regiment was exposed to a heavy cross fire. At this juncture occurred the sharpest and most critical part of the conflict.

The two pieces of artillery stationed in the pike, on the west of the railroad, was, at call of General Hagood, sent to the left; and the second regiment from the left was drawn out to support the left regiment, the regiment on the right closing in to fill the interval. General Hagood's left now advanced, drove the enemy back with heavy loss, and regained the railroad to the left of his former position. The enemy again advanced on Hagood's front, his brigade being under cover of the railroad, and were driven back with heavy loss. During both conflicts the artillery on the left of Craig's House played handsomely upon the enemy's line which had advanced on the east side of Ashton Creek and attacked Hagood's front. The pieces nearest Craig's House had several horses killed and one of the carriages damaged. The artillery sent to the left was badly served, and gave but little assistance. Lieutenant-Colonel Estleman brought up in the evening a battery of the Washington artillery, which was sent to the support of Hagood's brigade, but it was then too late to afford any assistance. The infantry ceased firing, save a few sharp-shooters, about 4 o'clock P. M. The artillery continued fire until about 6 o'clock, when the enemy retired from the field. The enemy's loss is supposed to be about 1,000 men. Prisoners have estimated it much higher. The Provost Marshal of Johnson's brigade reports twenty-one prisoners captured. I distinguished four brigades of Federals in the field. Their forces are reported to have consisted of five brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General W. T. H. Brooks. Our aggregate

was 2,668, of which 1,500 were of Hagood's brigade and 1,168 of Johnson's brigade.

The conflict was maintained on our side entirely by Hagood's brigade and the artillery. My right flank—Johnson's brigade,—after making the demonstration as stated on the enemy's left, had only to watch the threatening columns of some two brigades in its front. Seven men of that brigade were wounded, one mortally, while Hagood's brigade lost 177, viz: 22 killed, 142 wounded, and 13 missing. Brigadier-General Hagood handled his men with marked ability, coolness, courage and watchful care. His report, herewith enclosed, will furnish more particular details in regard to the meritorious services of officers and men. The steady valor of his command was worthy of its State and the great cause for which it is fighting.

After dark another regiment and a battalion of Hagood's brigade arrived, giving us an aggregate of about 3,500. It was evident that the enemy's force was much superior to our own, and no doubt was entertained in regard to their receiving new accessions.

During the evening I received the following communication:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT NORTH CAROLINA,  
PETERSBURG, VA., May 7th, 1864,  
5 o'clock P. M.

GENERAL.—If you *cannot* hold your present position you had better come back to Swift Creek.

The enemy are advancing on this side of the river; have sent you every man that has arrived. For safety I must stop the next detachment here. Even should they come on, which is problematical.

Very respectfully,

[Signed] G. G. PICKETT, *Major-General.*

*General B. Johnson, Commanding Port Walthall Junction.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTH CAROLINA,  
PETERSBURG, May 7th, 7 P. M.

GENERAL.—If you cannot hold your present position, you must fall back to the line of the Swift Creek. Send one regiment to reinforce Clingman at once. We are compelled to protect our right flank. Make your dispositions at once. I will continue to send on whatever troops which may arrive, although I cannot learn at what time the next detachment may come on.

Please make a report to me. Let me know exactly what you are doing. I am, General,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[Signed]

G. G. PICKETT, *Major General.*

*Brigadier-General Bushrod Johnson, Commanding, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTH CAROLINA,  
PETERSBURG, VA., Saturday, 1864.

GENERAL.—I have sent you two dispatches this evening, and have received no reply. I have received no re-enforcements except what you have now with you. You will fall back, therefore, to Swift Creek, bringing off your artillery which has been disabled first. Place one regiment and a battery in position on the crossing of the road from Chesterfield Courthouse to this point. Leave a line of pickets to withdraw at daylight. Intrenching tools will be sent you at Swift Creek.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[Signed]

G. G. PICKETT, *Major-General.*

This was received by me about 10 P. M. on the 7th of May, 1864.

Between 10 and 11 P. M. the artillery was put in motion. At 12 P. M. the infantry moved, and by 3 A. M. on the morning of the 8th of May our forces had crossed to the south bank of Swift Creek. During the day and night of the 8th I sent out several parties to the junction to collect property, arms and accoutrements. The field of battle was occupied by our troops until about 10 A. M. on Monday, the 9th inst., when the enemy advanced upon our position at Swift Creek. In this advance they passed to the north of the junction. From reports of cavalry and from the observations of Major-General Hill, who returned from the junction about 10 A. M., the enemy must have come into the turnpike, south of Timsberry (?) Creek. From subsequent information it appears that a portion of their forces went as far north as Chester. During the 8th and the morning of the 9th our troops were engaged in constructing a good line of rifle pits with batteries under the supervision of Col. Harris. Hagood's brigade was posted on the left, covering the turnpike bridge, and extending well out on either side. A detachment from this brigade and a section of artillery occupied Brander's bridge on the extreme left. McKathen's Fifty-first North Carolina regiment covered the railroad bridge, and Tilman's brigade was posted on the right, covering Level Ford and

adjacent grounds. Some eighteen pieces of artillery, consisting of Hankin's, Payne's, Owen's and Martin's batteries, were distributed along our lines mainly at the fords and bridges.

From the Forty-fourth Tennessee regiment, Johnson's brigade, twenty-two men and three sergeants, under Lieutenant F. M. Kelso, were detached to man the heavy artillery in Fort Clifton, where Captain S. J. Martin commanded.

At 9 o'clock A. M. on the 9th of May, a small boat appeared in the Appomattox below Fort Clifton, which was fired on and driven off. At about 11 A. M. five gun boats advanced and engaged the battery at Fort Clifton. The firing was continued from the first until after 2 o'clock, P. M., when four gun boats retired and the fifth was found to be crippled. A party was organized to board the boat, but the enemy set fire to it, abandoned and burned it.

For their services and gallant conduct at Fort Clifton, in the fight with the gun boats on the 9th of May, the officers and men have received the special commendation of the General commanding the department.

By 12th May the enemy were in strong force on the north side of Swift Creek, and slight skirmishing was commenced with artillery and infantry. About 11 A. M. I received a note from Major-General Pickett informing me that reinforcements were on their way from Weldon, and advising me not to bring on a general engagement if possible to avoid it. At 2 P. M. I received the following dispatch from Major-General Pickett:

HEADQUARTERS PETERSBURG,  
May 9th, 1864, 1 P. M.

GENERAL,—The Major-General commanding directs that you move forward at once and see what the enemy are doing. Further instructions will be sent in course of half an hour. I inclose a copy of dispatch just received from General Bragg.

I am, General, yours, &c.,

[Signed] C. PICKETT, A. A. G.  
*To Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, Commanding, &c.*

I immediately ordered General Hagood to move forward by the turnpike and take the eminence beyond the creek, believing from the dispatch of General Bragg that it was my duty to press upon the enemy with nearly my whole force. I now dispatched to Major-General Pickett that I had received the order to advance, and had given the order to commence the movements. The skirmishers of

Hagood's brigade had not engaged the enemy when I received the following communication:

HEADQUARTERS PETERSBURG,  
May 9th, 1864.

GENERAL,—The Major General commanding directs me to say to you that you had better hold the line of Swift Creek till reinforcements arrive, and we can then make the advance.

Try and find out whether the present demonstration is a feint or a real movement. I am, General, with much respect,

Your obedient servant,

[Signed]

C. PICKETT, A. A. G.

*To Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, Commanding, &c.*

My dispatch announcing to General Pickett that I had given orders to commence the movement, was returned with the following endorsement:

HEADQUARTERS PETERSBURG,  
May 9th, 1864.

GENERAL.—Since the order was given for you to advance, General Pickett has sent another countermanding it, and telling you to hold the line of Swift Creek if the enemy, as reported, were advancing in force on you.

[Signed]

C. PICKETT, A. A. G.

*General Johnson, Commanding, &c.*

As a consequence of these communications, the movement ordered became a reconnoissance with a part of Hagood's brigade. The enemy were found in heavy force in vicinity of the turnpike, on the north side of Swift Creek. After a very sharp skirmish General Hagood withdrew his forces from the north side of the creek, having lost, in a brief period, nine officers and 128 men, killed, wounded and missing. It was evident that the whole of the enemy's forces were in our front. Communications were received during the night from Major-General Ransom and Brigadier-General Barton, at Drewry's Bluff, inquiring for the enemy, and stating that there had been but little demonstration in their front during the day. The enemy's sharpshooters were now pressed forward, especially in the vicinity of the railroad bridge. They reached a fence in the open field, within some five or six hundred yards of the Dunlop House, and very much annoyed our main line. With the first design of making a determined attack upon

the enemy, the Fifty-first South Carolina regiment had been replaced at this point by a part of the Sixty-third Tennessee regiment. Captain J. W. Robertson, of the latter regiment, was now directed to take two companies and drive the enemy's skirmishers back. This was handsomely done by a charge. Somewhat later, in the darkness of the night the enemy's reserve—about a regiment—made a demonstration, fired a volley on our skirmishers, raised a shout and made an effort to charge them, but Captain Robertson's command held its position until a late hour at night, when it was relieved by two companies of the Fifty-First North Carolina regiment. A heavy line of skirmishers, under Lieutenant-Colonel Akin, of the Sixty-third Tennessee, held Level Ford during the night of the 9th. The enemy, however, attempted to cross some men above the ford, and brought up a piece of artillery to the stream, but they were promptly driven back by a detachment under Capt. Millord, of the Sixty-third Tennessee regiment.

In the skirmishing at Swift Creek. Johnson's brigade had five men wounded, one mortally, making the total number of casualties at that point 142. The loss of the enemy was, perhaps about an equal number.

During the morning of the 10th, parts of Wise's, Ransom's and Hoke's brigades arrived. About half-past 1 P. M. the prevailing quietude along the line induced me to order the artillery near the railroad bridge to open. It drew no response from the enemy, who had previously made very free use of a battery of artillery just opposite. I then ordered forward our skirmishers, and found the enemy had withdrawn without any manifest cause.

Major-General Hoke arrived this evening and assumed command on the morning of the 11th of May.

I forward herewith Col. R. F. Graham's report of the affair at Port Walthall junction on the evening of the 6th of May; also Brigadier-General Hagood's report of the actions and casualties at Port Walthall junction on the 7th and at Swift Creek on the 9th of May, 1864.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[Signed]

B. R. JOHNSON, *Major-General.*

Is the "Eclectic History of the United States," Written by Miss Thalheimer and Published by Van Antwerp, Bragg & Co., Cincinnati, a Fit Book to be Used in Our Schools?

*A Review by J. WM. JONES.*

PAPER NO. I.

We propose to confine ourselves for the present to that part of this so-called "History" which treats of the origin, progress, and results of the late "War between the States." At some future day we may take occasion to point out some of its "sins of omission and commission" in its account of the Colonial, Revolutionary, and civil history of the country.

We will first give a few illustrations of the *tone and spirit* of the book, which its friends claim to be preëminently fair, non-partisan, and non-sectional.

1. Let any one turn to the account given (pp. 265-266) of the Kansas troubles and he will find that it is entirely one sided and partisan—telling of outrages committed by the pro-slavery party, aided by Missourians, and saying not one word about the "Emigrant Aid Societies" of the North—the eloquent appeals of Mr. Beecher to "send Sharp's Rifles to Kansas instead of Bibles"—or the outrages committed by the Abolition party of Kansas.

2. The friends of the book think that it (p. 268) tells the truth when it says that John Brown "*had no support*" in his raid, and that therefore the "rage of resentment" through the South was uncalled for. We would advise them to read up on this question, and they will find that in the Senate of Massachusetts a motion to adjourn on the day of John Brown's execution in respect to his memory was lost by only three votes—that town bells were tolled, funeral sermons preached, and eulogies pronounced all over the North—that John Brown at once took his place in the pantheon of Abolition saints—and that the resentment of the South was justly aroused, not against this mad fanatic, but against his *supporters*, whose vanguard he led in invading the South to free the negroes whom their Fathers had sold to our Fathers, quietly pocketing the money, and only discovering the "crime of slavery" after they had reaped its full benefits.

3. The book (p. 270) pronounces the firing on the "Star of the West" at Charleston "*the opening act of the civil war.*" On page 276, speaking of Lincoln's inaugural address, it says: "He threw



upon the politicians of the South the whole responsibility of the calamities which must follow the destruction of the Union, assuring them that there could be no conflict unless they themselves should choose to begin it," and (same page, 276,) then proceeds to give the account of the bombardment of Sumter, without one single hint of the circumstances under which the Confederates opened fire.

The author ignores the efforts of Virginia to keep the peace by calling the Peace Conference—the Crittenden compromise, which was a Southern peace measure—the sending by South Carolina of peace commissioners, who were promised by Mr Buchanan that "the *status*" in Charleston harbor should not be disturbed, but who refused to order Major Anderson back, when, in violation of the compact, he removed by night from Moultrie to Sumter—the fact that the "Star of the West" was attempting to violate again the plain terms of the compact by reinforcing and provisioning Sumter—the fact that one of the very first acts of the Confederacy was to send commissioners to Washington "to treat with the Federal authorities for a peaceful and amicable adjustment upon the principles of equity and justice, of matters pertaining to the common property and public debt"—that Mr. Seward promised that Sumter should be evacuated, and assured the commissioners that "faith as to Sumter" was "fully kept" at the very time that a powerful fleet for its reinforcement, secretly fitted out, was almost within sight of its walls—that this expedition was persisted in, notwithstanding the Confederate commissioners assured Mr. Seward that it would be regarded as "a declaration of war against the Confederate States"—and that under all of the circumstances, therefore, the firing on Sumter was as purely an act of *self-defence* as is to be found in all history.

4. On page 271 the author revives the old slander that secession cabinet officers of Mr. Buchanan filled Southern arsenals with arms taken from the North, and scattered the army and navy so that the South should be better prepared for war than the North.

Compare the statement given there—that "The National Government was paralyzed. Its navy was scattered to the most distant seas, and a great part of its cannon, rifles, and military stores were in Southern forts and arsenals, which were taken almost without exception by the authorities of the Confederate States"—with the statement in paragraph 497, pages 279-280, that the South "had begun the war with abundant supplies of money and material," [notice that the author here refers back to paragraph 484 for proof], and it seems perfectly clear that the book means to teach that secession "leaders

in the cabinet of Mr. Buchanan" had stripped Northern arsenals to supply the South with arms, had scattered the navy in order to paralyze the "National Government," and had really brought it about that the South was better prepared for the war than the North. This is a favorite theory with Northern writers, it is fully brought out in such books as Greely, Draper, Lossing, Moore's *Rebellion Record* and Badeau, which the author advises our children to read, and we are not surprised that she adopts it.

This theory is, of course, utterly untrue, and would seem to need no labored refutation; but if any one desires to go into the matter more fully, let him read the article on Confederate Ordnance, by the able and accomplished chief of the Department, General J. Gorgas, published in the January-February, '84, number of our SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY PAPERS, and they will find a thorough refutation of this slander, a precise statement of the very small number of arms with which the Confederacy begun the war, and a clear account of how we were not only without arms, but without arsenals, armories, foundries, percussion cap manufactories, machinery, powder mills, material, or even skilled workmen.

And when it is remembered that the white population upon which the Confederacy could draw was even nominally but a little more than 7,000,000—but really only 5,000,000—while the Northern Government had a white population of more than 20,000,000, with the rest of the world as their recruiting ground, that the North was the great manufacturing region, and that the Northwest was accustomed to furnish the cotton States with the bulk of their provisions, it seems amazing for any one to argue that the South was in any respect better prepared for war than the North, save in the *morale* of her soldiers and the patriotic devotion of her noble women.

5. We insist that it is untrue as stated (p. 277) that Missouri, Kentucky and Maryland "*refused to secede*," in the light of General Lyon's operations in Missouri, the arrest and imprisonment of the secession members of the Maryland Legislature, and the pinning of Kentucky to the Union by Federal bayonets.

6. All of the ingenious twisting possible cannot make the account of the Baltimore riot (p. 277) fair, in view of the well-established facts that the troops fired first on the citizens, in response to their jeers and the throwing of several stones from the crowd, and that the attempt to make this Massachusetts regiment the representatives of the patriots who were fired on by British soldiers at Lexington in 1775, exactly reverses and falsifies the truth of history. These Massachu-

setts soldiers were the invaders, and the unarmed citizens of Baltimore (nine of whom were killed and a number wounded, while only two soldiers were killed and several wounded) were the patriotic defenders of their homes; the soldiers were the representatives of despotic power, and the citizens of patriots struggling for independence.

7. The statement (p. 278) that "a majority of the people" of West Virginia "were attached to the Union" is utterly untrue, in view of the fact that only 20,000 votes were cast against secession in the whole limits of old Virginia. And certainly our children should not be taught, even by implication, that this infamous division of Virginia territory—this "political rape"—was in any sense justifiable.

8. We call attention to the outrage, at the bottom of page 281, of teaching our children that in the death of Abraham Lincoln "The South felt that it had lost its best friend;" . . . and that "his name is fitly coupled with that of Washington, and the martyred President will ever remain *sacred* in the memory of the American people." This is in the same spirit as the statement (p. 309) that Phil. Sheridan was "the most able cavalry leader of the war"—that Sherman's "march to the sea" (p. 310) was "one of the most celebrated events of history"—that, "considering his surroundings and the place of his birth, Geo. H. Thomas's adherence to the Union (p. 303) is remarkable"—that "the characteristics of E. M. Stanton's administration (p. 327) were integrity, energy, determination, singleness of purpose, and the power to comprehend the magnitude of the rebellion and the labor and cost in blood and treasure involved in suppressing it"—that Grant's "generalship at Chattanooga is considered by military authorities the masterpiece of the war," and the horrible sacrifice of his men in the campaign of '64 justifiable, and that President Hayes, in making his appointments, (p. 339) consulted "the service of the public rather than that of the politicians," and regulated "both his appointments and dismissals by questions of personal worth."

And in this connection we call especial attention to the general scope and bearing of the biographical sketches given in the book—eleven very tame sketches of Confederates, and twenty-six sketches of Federals, most of the latter glowing eulogies.

It will not do to say that the sketches are chiefly of Generals commanding armies, for many of the Federals sketched would not come under this head, while a number of Confederates who commanded armies, such as John B. Floyd, Henry A. Wise, J. A. Early, John B. Hood, S. D. Lee, Leonidas Polk, Stirling Price, Earl Van Dorn,

Kirby Smith, Dick Taylor, Hardee, &c., are omitted. The truth is the Confederates largely outnumbered the Federals in men worthy of places in *general* history, and for Southern schools it is unpardonable to omit such names as Ashby, Stuart, Forrest, Hampton, Ewell, A. P. Hill, Pat. Cleburne, M. F. Maury, Buchanan, and scores of others who should be household words among our people.

The sketches of Lee and Jackson are the only ones which make any pretence to being even fairly appreciative, (and *they* are both utterly unworthy of their subjects,) and that of Lee is marred by inexcusable blunders in his name, and place of birth, in giving him the position of commander-in-chief of the Confederate armies in 1862, and in apologizing for his "grave mistake" in invading Pennsylvania, in 1863, on the ground that he yielded "his own judgment and advice to a higher political power," whereas the facts are that this campaign was undertaken not only with General Lee's full approbation, but at his own suggestion, and that it would have culminated in a brilliant success, and in the Independence of the Confederacy, but for the failure of others.

9. We insist that the statement about the "plundered Kentuckians" (p. 286) is false, and that if it were true it would be unfair to introduce it without also bringing out, as the book fails to do, the universal plundering done by Federal troops in the South, and the orders of General Lee in Pennsylvania.

10. The statements on pages 295-296 that Mr. Lincoln acted in good faith as to slavery (notwithstanding he said in his inaugural address that he had no right or disposition to interfere with it), and that "*the South*" had declared slavery to be "the corner-stone" of the Confederacy, are so palpably untrue as to need no discussion. The quotation from Mr. Stephens (whose utterances were very far from being those of "*the South*"), might be met by quoting the declaration of General Lee, that "if the slaves of the South were mine, I would free them at once to avert this war," and by other facts which we have not time to give.

Our printers admonish us that we have no more space, and we must reserve for our next other illustrations of the miserable stuff which some of the children of the South are learning.

## EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

---

RENEWALS ARE NOT ONLY STILL "IN ORDER," but are absolutely essential to the comfort and well-being of "these headquarters."

Three dollars is a small matter to the individual subscriber, but the one thousand three dollars due us is a very large matter to us. In fact, it is just exactly the difference between meeting all of our expenses this year without trouble, and being seriously embarrassed in meeting our current obligations.

We beg, therefore, that those indebted to us will *remit at once*, and not wait for further dunning of any kind whatever. *We need your subscription now.*

---

THE "LEE CAMP FAIR," held in Richmond, was a splendid success, and a very handsome sum was realized for the "Confederate Home." So soon as the plans of the committee are fully matured, we will announce them; but we may say that in the meantime more money will be needed to carry out these plans, and contributions to the fund are still in order.

---

THE "SOLDIERS' HOME OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA" has been fully organized, with General F. T. Nichols as President, and John H. Murray as Treasurer, and we have received the report for the year ending 1st of May, 1884, which gives a most encouraging exhibit of its affairs.

They have twenty-two inmates of the "Home," and seem to have made all proper arrangements for their care, and admirable regulations for the management of the "Home."

---

COLONEL HEROS VON BORCKE, the gallant and accomplished Prussian, who tendered his sword to the Confederacy and served with such distinction on the staff of General J. E. B. Stuart, is now on a visit to his old comrades, and has been received with open arms at Baltimore, Richmond, and at other points.

Confederates generally will give him a warm welcome and a hearty greeting.